Gossip protocols, also called rumor spreading or epidemic protocols, are widely used to disseminate information in massive peer-to-peer networks. These protocols are often claimed to guarantee privacy because of the uncertainty they introduce on the node that started the dissemination. But is that claim really true? Can one indeed start a gossip and safely hide in the crowd? This paper is the rst to study gossip protocols using a rigorous mathematical framework based on di erential privacy to determine the extent to which the source of a gossip can be traceable. Considering the case of a complete graph in which a subset of the nodes are curious sensors, we derive matching lower and upper bounds on the di erential privacy parameters. Crucially, our results show that gossip protocols can naturally guarantee some privacy without the need for additional perturbations, and reveal that asynchronous protocols provide a di erent and stronger type of privacy guarantees than their synchronous counterparts. Furthermore, while the optimal privacy guarantees are attained at the cost of a drastic reduction of the dissemination speed, we show that one can devise gossip protocols achieving both fast spreading time and near-optimal privacy.
INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer networks enable people to share information without the need for any central authority. Some of this information may be sensitive, and people sharing it may not want to be identi ed, for instance because of copyright infringement when sharing music, or in the case of whistle-blowers. Anonymous sharing platforms can also help people exercise their right to freedom of expression in totalitarian regimes. Conversely, it may be important to locate the source of a (computer or biological) virus, or fake news, spreading in a network. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the fundamental limits on privacy and anonymity in information dissemination. Gossip protocols (also called rumor spreading or epidemic protocols), in which nodes randomly choose a neighbor to exchange information, are both simple and e cient [1, 6, 22, 29, 37] . They can be used to spread and aggregate information in distributed databases [2, 7, 12, 30, 31] and social networks [13] , as well as to optimize cost functions involving distributed datasets in machine learning [10, 14, 26, 38] . A folklore belief is that gossip protocols guarantee source anonymity because users cannot know who issued the information in the rst place [23] . Although a lot of work has been devoted to assessing how e ciently one could locate the source of a gossip in speci c settings [28, 36, 41] , the general anonymity claim has never been studied from a pure privacy perspective, independently of any particular attack model. Intuitively indeed, random and local exchanges improve privacy, but to what extent? Given the importance of privacy and peer-to-peer information dissemination, it is crucial to study the limitations of this claim through a principled approach. This is the challenge we take up in this paper for the classic case of a complete network graph.
Our rst contribution is an information-theoretic model of anonymity in gossip protocols based on an adaptation of (ϵ, δ )-di erential privacy (DP) [15] . Originally introduced in the database community, DP is a precise mathematical framework recognized as the gold standard for studying the privacy guarantees of information release protocols. In our proposed model, the information to protect is the source of the gossip, while the attackers are a subset of curious nodes monitoring the communications they receive. We make an intuitive, yet crucial distinction between the synchronous and asynchronous settings: in the former, the attackers observe a global timestamp along with each communication they receive, while in the latter they only know the relative order between the communications. Our notion of DP then requires that the probability of any possible observation of the attackers is almost the same regardless of which node is the source. A key novel aspect of our model is that the mechanism that seeks to ensure DP comes only from the natural randomness and partial observability of gossip protocols, not from additional perturbation or noise as generally needed to guarantee DP [17] . We believe our adaptation of DP to be of independent interest. We also complement it with a notion of prediction uncertainty which guarantees that even unlikely events do not fully reveal the identity of the source under a uniform prior. This property gives an upper bound on the probability of success of any source prediction protocol, including the maximum likelihood estimate.
Based on our proposed model, we then establish matching upper and lower bounds on the privacy guarantees of gossip protocols. Essentially, our upper bounds on di erential privacy are derived from the fact that (i) it is quite likely that the node starting the rumor discloses it to an attacker during the rst rounds, whereas (ii) this is extremely unlikely to happen for a random node xed in advance. Interestingly, our results highlight a fundamental qualitative di erence in the privacy guarantees of the synchronous and asynchronous settings: unlike their synchronous counterparts, asynchronous gossip protocols can satisfy prediction uncertainty and ful ll a strict version of di erential privacy. We show that the upper bounds on privacy are matched by a gossip protocol which has very slow spreading time (linear in the number of nodes), highlighting an interesting tension between privacy and dissemination speed.
To capture this trade-o between speed and privacy, we introduce a parameterized gossip protocol in which nodes have a xed probability of forgetting the rumor after each communication. This gives the protocol the ability to forget initial conditions, thereby ensuring the privacy of the source. The standard "push" gossip protocol [37] , as well as the optimally private but slow protocol we previously introduced, can both be derived from our parameterized scheme with speci c choices of the parameter. We show that the standard gossip protocol is inherently not di erentially private for arbitrarily large graphs, but that it is possible to devise gossip protocols that are near-optimally private with spreading time logarithmic in the size of the graph. We prove the protocol speed by analyzing the mean dynamics of gossip and leveraging concentration inequalities. The privacy results are obtained by showing that only a small fraction of the possible outcomes have di erent probabilities when two di erent nodes initially have the gossip. This requires to precisely evaluate the probability of well-chosen worst-case sequences, which is generally hard as randomness is involved both when nodes decide to stop sending messages as well as when they choose who to send messages to.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss related work in Section 2. In Section 3, we formally introduce our model and privacy de nitions. In Section 4, we give matching upper and lower bounds on the privacy guarantees of gossip protocols, and present a privacy-optimal but slow protocol. Section 5 studies how to control the trade-o between speed and privacy. Finally, we conclude in Section 6 by discussing open questions.
RELATED WORK 2.1 Gossiping
The idea of disseminating information in a distributed system by having each node push messages to a randomly chosen neighbor, initially coined the random phone-call model, dates back to even before the democratization of the internet [22, 37] . Such protocols, later called gossip, epidemic or rumor spreading, were for instance applied to ensure the consistency of a replicated database system [2, 12] . Indeed, gossip protocols scale very well with the size of the system while deterministic consistency becomes too expensive to ensure among the replicas. They have gained even more importance when argued to model information spreading in social networks [13] . Gossip protocols can also be used to compute aggregate queries on a database distributed across the nodes of a network [7, 30, 31] , and have recently become popular in machine learning for optimizing cost functions involving distributed datasets [10, 14, 26, 38] . Gossip protocols di er according to their interaction schemes, i.e., pull or push, sometimes combining both [29] . In this work, we focus on the classical push form in the case of a complete graph. Gossip protocols have also been generalized for graphs of any given conductance [24, 40] . Di erences between synchronous and asynchronous gossip protocols in general graphs have also been investigated in [1, 25] . The trade-o between spreading time and number of messages exchanged was studied in [6] .
Locating the gossip source
Determining the source of a gossip has been an active research topic, especially given the potential applications to social networks (see [28] for a recent survey). Existing approaches have focused so far on building protocols to compute or approximate the maximum likelihood estimate of the source given some observed information. Each approach typically assumes a speci c kind of graphs (e.g., trees, small world, etc.), dissemination model and observed information. In rumor centrality [41] [42] [43] , the gossip communication graph is assumed to be fully observed and the goal is to determine the center of this graph in order to deduce the node that started the gossip. Another line of work studies the setting in which some nodes are curious sensors that inform a central entity whenever they receive a message [36] . Gossiping is assumed to happen at random times and the source node is estimated by comparing the di erent timings at which the information reaches the sensors. The speci c attack considered in this work is very natural in trees but does not generalize to highly connected graphs in which all nodes are approximately at the same distance (in which other attacks may have a higher probability of success). The work of [21] focuses on the problem of hiding the source instead of locating it. The observed information is a snapshot of who has the rumor at a given time. A speci c dissemination protocol is proposed to hide the source but the privacy guarantees they obtain only hold for tree graphs.
We stress the fact that the privacy guarantees that can be derived from the above work (i.e., the probability not to be detected) only hold under the speci c attacks considered therein. Furthermore, all approaches rely on maximum likelihood and hence assume a uniform prior on the probability of each node to be the source. The guarantees would thus break in case the protocol was run twice from the same source, or if the attacker knew that some of the nodes could not have started the rumor.
Di erential privacy
While we borrow ideas from the approaches mentioned above (e.g., we assume that a subset of nodes are curious sensors as in [36] ), our work di ers fundamentally for we aim at studying the fundamental privacy limits of any gossip source location protocol, independently of any speci c attack, by evaluating the amount of information that is released during a gossip scheme. For this purpose, a general and robust notion of privacy is required. Many privacy de nitions exist but di erential privacy [15, 17] has emerged as a gold standard for it holds independently of any assumption on the model, the computational power, or the background knowledge that the attacker may have. Di erentially private protocols have been proposed for numerous problems in the elds of databases, data mining and machine learning: examples include computing aggregate and linear counting queries [17, 33] , releasing and estimating graph properties [11, 34] , clustering [27] and recently deep learning [44] .
In this work, we consider the classic relaxed version of di erential privacy which involves two parameters ϵ, δ ≥ 0 that quantify the privacy guarantee [16] . More precisely, given any two databases D 1 and D 2 that di er in at most one row (all the rows are the same except for one), 1 a (randomized) information release protocol P, and the set S of all possible outputs of P, protocol P is said to guarantee (ϵ, δ )-di erential privacy if for any S ⊂ S:
Parameter ϵ places a bound on the change in output distribution when changing one entry of the database, while parameter δ is assumed to be small and allows the bound to be violated with small probability. When δ = 0, we recover the strict ϵ-di erential privacy. The above privacy guarantees hold for any attack and are robust against strong background knowledge that the attacker may have about the records of the database (in particular, the attacker may know all records in D 1 and D 2 except the di ering ones). In our context, the background information could be the knowledge that the source is among a subset of k nodes. Robustness against such background knowledge is crucial in some applications, for instance when sharing secret information that few people could have known and leaked in the rst place. Another important feature of di erential privacy is composability: if (ϵ, δ )-di erential privacy holds for a release protocol, then querying this protocol two times about the same dataset satis es (2ϵ, 2δ )-di erential privacy. This is crucial in our context for it enables to quantify privacy when the source propagates multiple messages and the adversary is able to link them to the same source (e.g., due to the content of the message). This happens for instance when breaking big messages into multiple pieces, which is known to drastically improve spreading time for sharing large les [39] . Existing di erentially private protocols typically introduce additional perturbation (also called noise) to hide critical information [17] . In contrast, an original aspect of our work is to solely rely on the natural randomness and limited observability brought by gossip protocols to guarantee di erential privacy.
PROPOSED MODEL
Our rst contribution is a precise mathematical framework for studying the fundamental privacy guarantees of gossip protocols. We de ne the family of protocols we consider, their inputs and the outputs observed by the attackers during the execution of a protocol, as well as the privacy notions we consider. In the following, we consider a complete graph with n nodes labeled from 0 to n − 1.
Gossip protocols
To specify the class of protocols we consider in this paper, we rst de ne a key communication primitive. Denoting by I the set of informed nodes, tell_gossip(i, I ) allows an informed node i ∈ I to tell the information to another node j ∈ {0, ..., n − 1} chosen uniformly at random. tell_gossip(i, I ) returns j (the node that received the message) and the updated I (the new set of informed nodes that includes j). Equipped with this primitive, we can now de ne gossip protocols as follows. 2 De nition 3.1 (Gossip protocols). A gossip protocol on a complete graph is one that (a) terminates, (b) ensures that at the end of its execution, the set of informed nodes I = {0, ..., n − 1}, and (c) can modify I only through calls to the tell_gossip primitive.
Inputs and outputs
As recalled in Section 2.3, di erential privacy is a probabilistic notion that evaluates a protocol based on the variations of the output distribution for a change in the input. In this paper, we adapt it to our gossip context. We rst formalize the inputs and outputs, in the case of a single piece of information to disseminate (multiple pieces can be addressed through composition, see Section 2.3). A single node has the information (the gossip, or rumor) at the beginning of the protocol. This node de nes the input of the gossip protocol, and it is the actual "database" that we want to protect. In this sense, the source node is a database with n rows, each with a binary attribute which is 1 for the source node and 0 elsewhere.
We de ne the output of a gossip protocol as the information disclosed to some attackers during the execution of the protocol. In this work, we focus on attackers that can monitor a set of curious nodes C of size f , i.e. they observe all communications involving a curious node. More formally, a gossip protocol generates an ordered sequence S omni of triplets (t, i, j) of executions of tell_gossip where t counts the number of times the tell_gossip primitive has been called, i is the node on which tell_gossip was used and j the node that was told the information. This sequence corresponds to the output that would be observed by someone who could eavesdrop on all communications. Through the (random) execution of the protocol, the attackers we consider gather a (random) subsequence S ⊂ S omni since it only monitors a subset of the nodes.
We de ne two settings depending on the timing assumption that we make. In the synchronous setting, the attackers have access to the global counter telling them how many times the tell_gossip primitive has been invoked by the protocol. In the weaker asynchronous setting, curious nodes only have access to the relative order in which the information has been disclosed to them.
De nition 3.2. In the synchronous setting, a gossip protocol outputs the sequence S = ((t, i, j) ∈ S omni |j ∈ C). In the asynchronous setting, it outputs S = ((i, j)|(t, i, j) ∈ S omni , j ∈ C).
This natural distinction re ects the in uence of the time model used by the protocol. In the synchronous setting, there is a discrete global clock and we assume that nodes can concurrently perform a tell_gossip operation in one unit of time (round). This means that nodes know the global timestamp for the messages they receive, and can thus know how many rounds (and therefore have an estimate of how many communications) have happened in the network before they receive a given message. In contrast, time is continuous in the asynchronous setting: each node is equipped with an internal clock that ticks at the times of a rate 1 Poisson process [7] . Nodes can perform a tell_gossip operation at each of their internal clock ticks. Consequently, curious nodes know the relative order of communications they receive but not the global timestamps. Note that because we focus on complete graphs, knowing which curious node received the rumor gives no information on the starting node. For a given output sequence S, we therefore write S t = i to denote that tell_gossip has been used by node i at time t, when time is relative or absolute depending on the context. The ratio f /n of curious nodes in the graph determines the probability of the attacker to gather information. Unless otherwise noted, we assume this ratio to be constant. In particular, we see it as a quantity independent of n, otherwise the attacker would only become weaker as the graph grows bigger.
Privacy definitions
Now that we have precisely de ned the inputs and outputs of the "release protocols" that we consider, we can formally introduce privacy de nitions for the gossip problem. To ease notations, we denote by I 0 the source of the gossip (the set of informed nodes at time 0), and for any given i ∈ {0, ..., n − 1}, we denote by p i (E) = p(E|I 0 = 0) the probability of event E if node i is the source of the gossip. The release protocol is therefore abstracted in this notation. Recalling that S is the set of all possible outputs of the information release procedure, we say that a gossip protocol is (ϵ, δ )-di erentially private if:
where p(S) is the probability that the output belongs to the set S. This formalizes a notion of source indistinguishability in the sense that, with high probability, any output is almost as likely to be observed by the attackers regardless of who started the gossip ("nothing bad will happen with high probability"). Note however that when δ > 0, this de nition allows a protocol to release the identity of the source with small probability. To capture the fact that "nothing too bad will ever happen", we favor di erentially private protocols that also guarantee the complementary notion of prediction uncertainty.
De nition 3.3 (Prediction uncertainty).
A gossip protocol is said to guarantee c-prediction uncertainty if there exists a constant c > 0 such that for a uniform prior p(I 0 ) on source nodes and any i ∈ {0, ..., n − 1}:
Prediction uncertainty guarantees that no observable output S can identify a node as the source with large enough probability, ensuring that the probability of success of any source prediction protocol is upper bounded by 1/(1 + c). This holds in particular for the maximum likelihood estimate. Prediction uncertainty does not have the same robustness against background knowledge as di erential privacy, as it assumes a uniform prior on the source. While it can be shown that (ϵ, 0)-DP with ϵ > 0 implies prediction uncertainty, the converse is not true. Indeed, prediction uncertainty is satis ed as soon as no output identi es any node with enough probability, without necessarily making all pairs of nodes indistinguishable as in DP. As we show later, prediction uncertainty pinpoints a key advantage of asynchronous gossip protocols. Thanks to the symmetry of our problem, we can consider without loss of generality that node 0 starts the rumor (I 0 = {0}) and verify Equation 2 and Equation 3 only for i = 0 and j = 1.
We have kept our model relatively simple to avoid unnecessary technicalities in the derivation and presentation of our results. For completeness, we discuss the impact of some possible extensions (e.g., information observed by attackers, malicious behavior, termination criterion) in Appendix A.
OPTIMAL PRIVACY
In this section, we study the fundamental limits of gossip protocols in terms of privacy. Our main result is a set of tight bounds on the privacy guarantees that can be achieved by gossip protocols. We state and discuss these bounds in Section 4.1. We then present the optimally private gossip protocol that matches our bounds and discuss its properties in Section 4.2.
Main result: matching upper and lower bounds on privacy
We now state upper bounds on the di erential privacy and prediction uncertainty that hold for any gossip protocol in the sense of De nition 3.1. and c ≤ n f +1 − 1 in the asynchronous setting. Furthermore, these bounds are tight and matched by Algorithm 1 when its parameter is set to s = 0.
S
. (The complete proof of the statement can be found in Appendix B). To prove the lower bounds on the parameter δ of di erential privacy, we upper bound the probability that the rst node that communicates with a curious node is the source of the rumor. Then, we lower bound the probability that another node xed in advance communicates with a curious node. While the synchronous case is straightforward, the asynchronous setting is more subtle. We heavily rely on the observation that all nodes are equally likely to be the rst to disclose information to curious nodes after the rst message has been sent. Regarding prediction uncertainty, it is easy to show that c = 0 for synchronous gossip protocols by observing that outputs S such that S 0 = 0 (i.e., node 0 communicates with a curious node at time 0) have nonzero probability only if node 0 started the rumor. In contrast, in asynchronous protocols the event S 0 = 0 (i.e., node 0 is the rst to communicate with a curious node) has nonzero probability even if 0 did not start the rumor. Then, we use the same set of sequences that we used to prove the lower bound on di erential privacy to get the lower bound on prediction uncertainty. Theorem 4.1 shows that gossip protocols are able to naturally provide privacy guarantees. It also reveals a fundamental qualitative di erence between the synchronous and asynchronous settings. For di erential privacy in the synchronous setting, δ cannot be smaller than the proportion of curious nodes. This is rather intuitive since the source node is revealed with probability f /n (when the rst message is sent to a curious node). In contrast, it is possible to break this limit in the asynchronous case, where one can achieve δ smaller than f /n by setting ϵ > 0. One can even satisfy the strict version of di erential privacy (δ = 0) by setting ϵ ≈ log f , which provides good privacy guarantees when the number of curious nodes is not too large. We see an even more striking di erence in terms of prediction uncertainty, which is not satis ed by any protocol in the synchronous setting while strong guarantees are achievable in the asynchronous case. Combined with the di erential privacy result, this means that the most private synchronous protocol reveals the identity of the source with probability at least f /n. On the other hand, even though the probability of disclosing some information is still of order f /n in the asynchronous setting, the attackers always have a high probability of making a mistake in their attempt to locate the source.
Optimally private protocol
It turns out that the bounds of Theorem 4.1 are matched by a very simple protocol: nodes forward the message to exactly one random neighbor when they receive it and then stop emitting until they receive the message again. This protocol, which we refer to as private gossip, corresponds to a special case of the more general protocol described in Algorithm 1 when its parameter is s = 0 (see discussion in Section 5). Private gossip is similar to the protocol introduced by [21] in the sense that at each time step, the source changes and it is quickly impossible to recover which node started the gossip (as initial conditions are quickly forgotten). Private gossip ensures that (i) the gossip does not die before all nodes are informed, (ii) the state of the system (the set informed nodes I ) after round 0 is completely independent from the source node, and (iii) all nodes follow the same behavior. The rst property ensures that the protocol falls within De nition 3.1, the second one is key to match the optimal privacy parameters stated in Theorem 4.1 (see Appendix B.2 for the proof), and the third one prevents the source to be identi ed based on its special behavior, as in the naive alternative described below.
A naive alternative to the private gossip is as follows: the source node transmits the rumor to a random node and forgets it, then a standard gossip protocol (such as Algorithm 1 with s = 1) may start normally from the node that received the information. While this delayed start protocol guarantees optimal di erential privacy in the synchronous setting, it is fundamentally awed. In particular, even its asynchronous version does not guarantee prediction uncertainty in the sense that c → 0 as the size of the graph increases. This is because attackers can identify the source with high probability by detecting that it communicated only once and then stopped emitting for many rounds. We refer to Appendix D for details.
An obvious drawback of the private gossip protocol is that it is very slow, since only one node sends the rumor at any given time. To precisely quantify its dissemination speed, one can observe that it performs a random walk on the complete graph. Therefore, the number of gossip operations needed to inform all 
end for 7: end while Green nodes know the rumor, and red circled nodes are active. When s = 0, there is only one active node at a time, which always stops emi ing a er telling the gossip. The resulting protocol (private gossip) is private but slow. In the case s = 1, nodes always remain active once they know the rumor, leading to a fast but non private protocol (this is the standard push gossip protocol [37] ). When 0 < s < 1, each node remains active with probability s at each round, providing a trade-o between privacy and speed.
nodes can be reduced to the time needed for the classical coupon collection problem: it takes O(n log n) communications to inform all nodes with probability at least 1 − 1/n [18] . As the private gossip protocol performs exactly one communication at each round, it needs O(n log n) rounds to inform all nodes with high probability. This is much slower than the standard "push" gossip protocol, which requires only O(log n) rounds [22] , motivating the exploration of the privacy-speed trade-o . In the next section, we introduce gossip protocols with O(log n) speed and nearly optimal privacy.
FASTER PRIVATE GOSSIP PROTOCOLS
In this section, we study faster variants of the private gossip protocol in which nodes do not necessarily stop emitting after they rst transmit the information. Algorithm 1 describes a class of (synchronous) gossip protocols parameterized by s ∈ [0, 1], which ts De nition 3.1. Unlike the private gossip protocol, more than one node can spread the rumor at each round as the protocol maintains a set A of active nodes (initialized to the source node). At each round, each active node i ∈ A invokes the tell_gossip primitive to send the information to another node (which in turn becomes active), while i also stays active with probability s. This protocol, illustrated in Figure 1 , can be understood as a gossip protocol with a randomized version of fanout [20] . 3 Intuitively, the set of active nodes will grow until the probability of spawning an additional source (which is exactly s) is equal to the probability of losing a source (i.e., 1 − s times the probability of sending a message to a node that was already active). Parameter s controls the trade-o between privacy and speed: in particular, s = 0 recovers the private gossip protocol (optimal privacy) and s = 1 recovers the standard gossip protocol (optimal speed). In the rest of this section, we study how parameter s of Algorithm 1 impacts its privacy guarantees and its dissemination speed. Section 5.1 establishes that the privacy guarantees of the standard gossip protocol 3 Unlike in classic fanout, nodes start to gossip again each time they receive a message instead of deactivating permanently.
(s = 1) must be arbitrarily bad for large graphs. Then, we show in Section 5.2 that nearly optimal privacy can be achieved for smaller s. Finally, Section 5.3 studies the dissemination speed and shows that the known logarithmic di usion time of the standard gossip protocol also holds for s > 0, leading to a sweet spot in the privacy-speed trade-o .
Standard gossip is not di erentially private
Section 4 hints at the fact that gossip protocols need to forget initial conditions quickly in order to be private. In this section, we strengthen this intuition by showing that the di erential privacy guarantees of the standard gossip protocol (corresponding to Algorithm 1 with s = 1) become arbitrarily bad as the size of the graph increases (keeping the fraction of curious nodes constant). The proof of this result can be found in Appendix C. Essentially, it comes from the fact that the event "node 0 communicates with a curious node before node 1 gets the message" becomes more and more likely as n grows, hence preventing any meaningful di erential privacy guarantee when n is large enough. Theorem 5.1 is actually derived from a stronger result establishing lower bounds on the δ achievable by Algorithm 1 that depend on s (see Theorem C.1 in Appendix C). This motivates our interest for protocols with parameter s < 1.
Privacy guarantees of the fast private gossip protocol
The previous section clearly highlights the fact that the standard gossip protocol (s = 1) is not di erentially private. We now show that giving nodes the possibility to stop emitting by setting s < 1 is enough for the protocol to have non-trivial privacy guarantees. 
P . See Appendix E.1.
Theorem 5.2 proves a (0, δ )-di erential privacy result, which means that apart from some unlikely outputs that may disclose the identity of the source node, most outputs actually have the same probability regardless of which node started the di usion. The guarantee we obtain here holds for any graph with xed proportion f /n of curious nodes. Figure 2 (left) shows the gap between the di erential privacy guarantees given by Theorem 5.2 and the optimal guarantees of Theorem 4.1 (i.e., the ratio between the upper bound and lower bound on δ ). We can see that both bounds are of the same order of magnitude when s is not too large: in particular, the ratio is less than 2 for all s ≤ 0.5. This indicates that the privacy guarantees are very tight in this regime. Note that setting r = 1 in Theorem 5.2 leads to an additive gap of s(1 − f /n) between the privacy of Algorithm 1 and the optimal guarantee, showing that one can be as close as desired to the optimal privacy as long as s is chosen close enough to 0. We also recover exactly the optimal guarantee of Theorem 4.1 in the case s = 0 (without the ability to control the trade-o between ϵ and δ ). gives δ = 1 (trivial guarantees). This is expected because our bound does not depend on the size of the graph and Theorem 5.1 states that δ = 1 is needed for arbitrarily large graphs. However, it is still possible to have some privacy guarantees when n is not too large. We characterize these guarantees for xed values of n in Appendix F. They con rm that setting s < 1 allows to obtain much stronger privacy.
Importantly, we also prove that the asynchronous version of Algorithm 1 with s < 1 satis es prediction uncertainty, unlike the case where s = 1. 
Dissemination speed
We have shown in the previous section that parameter s has a signi cant impact of privacy, from optimal (s = 0) to very weak (s = 1) guarantees. Intuitively, s also impacts the dissemination speed: the larger s, the more active nodes at each round. This is highlighted by the two extreme cases, for which the speed is known and exhibits a large gap: O(log n) for s = 1 [22] while it is only O(n log n) when s = 0. To establish whether we can obtain a protocol that is both private and fast, we need to characterize the dissemination speed for the cases where 0 < s < 1.
The key result of this section is to prove that the logarithmic speed of the standard gossip protocol holds more generally for all s > 0. This result is derived from the fact that the ability to forget does not prevent an exponential growth phase. What changes is that the population of active nodes takes approximately 1/s rounds to double instead of 1 for standard gossip. T 5.4. For a given s > 0, there exists α > 0 such that for all C > 0, there exists n large enough such that the synchronous version of Algorithm 1 with parameter s sends at least Cn log n messages in Cα −1 log n rounds with probability at least 1 − 1/n.
S
. The key argument of the proof is that after a transition phase of a logarithmic number of rounds, a constant fraction of the nodes (depending on s) remains active despite the probability to stop emitting after each communication. The proof builds on ideas presented in Lemma 15 in [39] , and relies on mean-eld equations and concentration inequalities. The details can be found in Appendix G.1.
A similar result (with an appropriate notion of rounds) can be obtained for the asynchronous version of Algorithm 1 (see Appendix G.2 for details). These results show that our parameterized gossip protocol with s > 0 still has a logarithmic spreading time even if nodes can stop transmitting the message. Note that the constant α depends on s and will go to in nity as s → 0 because 1/s rounds are needed in expectation to double the population of active nodes (even without taking collisions into account). Simulations shown in Figure 2 (right) con rm that the fraction of active nodes grows exponentially fast for all values of s and then reaches a plateau when the probability of creating a new active node is compensated by the probability of message collisions (informing an already active node). Empirically, this happens when the fraction of active nodes is of order s, meaning that the last phase (during which the remaining uninformed nodes need to be reached by a stable number of s × n active nodes) remains short. This highlights the fact that Algorithm 1 remains signi cantly faster than the slow private gossip: for instance, dissemination speed for s = 0.5 is very close to the fastest case s = 1 (see Figure 2 , middle).
Combining with our previous results, we have thus shown that one can achieve both fast spreading and near-optimal privacy.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper initiates the study of privacy in gossip protocols to determine the extent to which the source of a gossip can be traceable. Our contributions are the following. (1) We proposed a formal model of anonymity in gossip protocols based on an adaptation of di erential privacy. (2) We established tight upper bounds on the privacy of gossip protocols, highlighting the natural privacy guarantees brought by gossip protocols as well as a fundamental di erence between the synchronous and the asynchronous cases. (3) We precisely captured the trade-o between privacy and speed with a parameterized gossip protocol allowing nodes to stop gossiping after some time, showing that we can design gossip protocols that are both fast and near-optimally private.
Our results leave open the question of whether the gap in prediction uncertainty between the cases s = 0 and s > 0 can be reduced or is in fact unavoidable. The analysis for s = 0 heavily relies on the fact that for any output sequence S, p i (S |S 0 ) does not depend on i and that p i (S 0 ) is rather easy to evaluate. These properties break when s > 0, leading to a substantially more involved analysis.
More broadly, our work opens several interesting perspectives. First, it paves the way to the study of the privacy guarantees of gossip protocols in arbitrary graphs. In this setting, the desired notion of privacy should allow two nodes to become more and more distinguishable as their distance in the graph increases, and could also depend on the distance to the closest curious node. This could be formalized by considering metric-based relaxations of di erential privacy [3, 8] , or Pu er sh privacy [32] . The latter is a exible framework that introduces the notion of secrets to protect, allowing for instance to encode the fact that two distant nodes in the network do not need to be indistinguishable.
Another exciting avenue for future research is motivated by some recent work showing that hiding the source of a message can signi cantly amplify di erential privacy guarantees for the content of the message [9, 19] . However, primitives to hide the source of messages such as onion routing [45] can be di cult and costly to deploy. Showing that gossiping can naturally amplify di erential privacy for the message contents would make gossip protocols very desirable for privacy-friendly distributed applications and privacy-preserving decentralized machine learning [5] .
A DISCUSSION ON MODEL EXTENSIONS
We have kept our model of Section 3 relatively simple to avoid unnecessary complexity in the notations and additional technicalities in the derivation and presentation of our results. In this section, we brie y discuss some possible extensions. Our main point is to illustrate the fact that they will generally lead to some technical complications without impacting the privacy guarantees signi cantly.
A.1 Pull and push-pull protocols
Our study focuses on the classic push form of gossip protocols. This can be justi ed by the fact that, for regular graphs, synchronous push has asymptotic spreading time guarantees that are comparable with the push-pull variant [25] . Besides, the di erential privacy guarantees of any gossip protocol are limited by the probability that the rst node informed by the source is a curious node, and we show this bound can be matched with push protocols. Nevertheless, extensions of our results to pull and push-pull variants of gossip protocols [29] are possible. Forgetting mechanisms similar to the ones in Algorithm 1 can be introduced for these protocols, i.e. nodes would have a probability 1 − s to stop disclosing information after each time they are pulled (if they do not pull someone with the information in between). Although slightly di erent, the optimal privacy guarantees would remain of the same order of magnitude. Yet, we expect pull guarantees to be much worse in the case s = 1 because curious nodes could stop suspecting all nodes that they have pulled and that did not have the rumor. Besides, the pull protocol for s = 0 would be even slower than its push counterpart.
A.2 Eavesdropping adversary
Since we consider a complete graph, our formalization of the attackers as a fraction f /n of curious nodes is closely related to an eavesdropping attacker who would observe each communication with probability f /n. Indeed, both models consider that each communication has a probability f /n of being disclosed to the attacker. Most of our results are thus easily transferable to this alternative setting. The only di erence would be that all nodes can be suspected in the eavesdropping model, thus introducing a (1 − f /n) −1 factor each time we consider the population of non-curious nodes.
A.3 Information observed by a ackers
We discuss two possible generalizations of the output observed by the attackers (De nition 3.2).
Messages sent by curious nodes. For simplicity of exposition, De nition 3.2 considers that curious nodes only observe messages that are sent to them and not the messages that they send. However, including the messages sent by curious nodes in their observed output would not impact the bounds on privacy (i.e., the guarantees for the algorithms). For the optimal algorithm of Section 4.2, we only consider what happens during the rst round, so including the messages sent by curious nodes does not change the result. This in particular implies that the fundamental limits of Theorem 4.1 remain the same (since the attackers observe strictly more information). Similarly, for the parameterized algorithm of Section 5, Theorem 5.2 is obtained by bounding the probability of a setŜ. Then, we have p(Ŝ, S out ) ≤ p(Ŝ) where S out is the sequence of messages sent by the curious nodes. In general, adding the messages sent by curious nodes to the output sequences has little or no impact on the results.
Message ordering in the asynchronous setting. We assume in De nition 3.2 that the relative order of messages is preserved in the output sequence observed by curious nodes. This could be relaxed in the asynchronous setting, as in practical scenarios a message sent before another may well be received after it. One could for instance introduce a random swapping model to take this into account and investigate whether this weaker output leads to an improvement in the privacy guarantees. However, we argue that this improvement would be quite limited. First of all, it would not a ect the privacy guarantees of Section 4: since there is a single active node able to send a message at any given time, swapping is not possible. Furthermore, even when several nodes are active at the same time (e.g., in Algorithm 1 with s > 0), the proofs can be adapted to work with counting the messages received instead of the messages sent. In this case, swapping is as likely to expose the source (making its messages arrive earlier) than to hide it (delaying the messages it sends). Therefore, privacy would not improve substantially.
A.4 Malicious behavior
In this work, we have assumed for simplicity that nodes are curious but not malicious, i.e., they follow the protocol. This is motivated by a practical scenario where a subset of nodes are simply being monitored by a curious entity. If curious nodes can also act maliciously, they have three possible ways to a ect the protocol: emitting more, emitting less, or not choosing neighbours uniformly at random. If they emit more, they will inform more nodes, which makes it more di cult for them to locate the source. If they emit less (potentially not at all), then in the case s < 1 the protocol could stop before all nodes are informed. Yet, the privacy bounds are derived from the fact that the source forgets the information before communicating to a curious node. If they choose the neighbors they send the messages to, it reduces to the case in which they emit less (because they do not send messages to uninformed nodes) but without a ecting protocol speed or termination (because it does not reduce the number of active nodes). Thus, the impact on the observed output and therefore on the privacy would be minimal. In the case s = 1, malicious nodes have slightly more impact but remain quite small as it only makes the set of informed nodes grow slightly slower.
A.5 Termination criterion
For simplicity, in all our gossip protocols we have used a global termination criterion (the protocol terminates when all nodes are informed). Termination without using global coordination is a problem in its own right that has been extensively studied (see for instance [29] ). Although some termination criteria could have a great impact on privacy, we argue that termination can be handled late in the execution so as to reveal very little about the beginning, hence avoiding any signi cant impact on privacy. For instance, it is possible to design a variant of Algorithm 1 in which nodes only ip a coin with probability s for a xed number of times, and then stop emitting completely. This xed number would have to depend on s, but then if it is large enough, it would guarantee both termination and privacy. Indeed, nodes would not communicate with curious nodes each time they are activated with high probability so this counter would actually provide very little information to the curious nodes. Determining how large this number of iterations should be, and the exact impact on privacy (which we argue is very small), is beyond the scope of this paper.
B PROOFS OF THE OPTIMAL PRIVACY RESULTS
In this section, we prove Theorem 4.1. To do so, we start by deriving the lower bounds on the privacy parameters and then show that they are matched by the private gossip protocol.
B.1 Lower bounds
To this end, we introduce a useful technical lemma which directly follows from the de nition of di erential privacy and is at the heart of our lower bound proofs. Lemma B.1 means that proving a lower bound on the di erential privacy parameters can be achieved by nding a set of possible outputs S (here, a set of ordered sequences) that is more likely if node 0 starts the gossip than if node 1 does. It is a direct application of the de nition of di erential privacy. L B.1. Given any gossip protocol, let S ⊂ S and w 0 , w 1 ∈ R be such that w 0 ≤ p 0 (S) and p 1 (S) ≤ w 1 . If the protocol satis es (ϵ, δ ) di erential privacy then δ ≥ w 0 − e ϵ w 1 .
The lower bound result we would like to prove is the following:
T
. If a gossip protocol satis es (ϵ, δ )-di erential privacy and c-prediction uncertainty then we have δ ≥ f n and c = 0 in the synchronous setting, and δ ≥ f n 1 − e ϵ −1 f and c ≤ n f +1 − 1 in the asynchronous setting.
P
. We start with the synchronous case. Since tell_gossip requires that the input node i is in I and that at the beginning, I = {0}, the rst time the procedure is called must be on node 0. The procedure is called at least once otherwise the protocol terminates with I = {0}, violating the conditions of De nition 3.1. We denote by S (0) the set of output sequences such that S 0 = 0 (i.e., 0 communicated with a curious node at time 0). Since the protocol is run on the complete graph, the node selected by tell_gossip is chosen uniformly within {0, ..., n − 1}, so a curious node is selected with probability f n . We thus have p 0 (S (0) ) = f n . Besides, node 0 cannot communicate with a curious node at time 0 if node 1 starts the rumor so p 1 (S (0) ) = 0.
We conclude by Lemma B.1. For prediction uncertainty, using the same sequence S (0) yields p i (S (0) ) p 0 (S (0) ) = 0 for all i 0 and therefore c = 0.
We now prove the result for the asynchronous setting. By the same reasoning as before, tell_gossip is called at least once and is rst called on node 0. Unlike in the synchronous case, recall that the event S 0 = 0 means that 0 was the rst to communicate with a curious node (which is not necessarily at time 0).
We denote by T c 0 the event such that the starting node does not communicate with a curious node for its rst communication. Conditionally upon T c 0 , the node that started the gossip is at least as likely as any other node to emit the second message, because with probability 1 n it is the only node with the rumor after the rst message is sent. Since the probability to hit a curious node is the same regardless of who sends the message, we have for all i, j C: p j (S 0 = i |T c 0 ) ≤ p j (S 0 = j |T c 0 ). From this inequality we get
where the equality comes from the fact that S 0 is the rst node that communicates with a curious node (and the curious nodes do not start with the information). The second inequality comes from the fact that p j (S 0 = i |T c 0 ) = p j (S 0 = k |T c 0 ) for all i, k di erent from j. Therefore, we have p 0 (S 0 = 0|T c 0 ) ≥ 1 n−f and p 0 (S 0 = 1|T c 0 ) ≤ 1 n−f . Combining the above expressions, we derive the probability of S (0) when 0 started the di usion:
We can then do the same split if node 1 initially has the message, but in this case p 1 S (0) |t c = 0 = 0 and we get p 1 (S (0) ) = p 1 (T c 0 )p 1 (S (0) |T c 0 ) ≤ 1 n . We conclude again by Lemma B.1. The upper bound on prediction uncertainty is derived using the same quantities. More precisely:
B.2 Optimal protocol
We now proceed to proving the second part of Theorem 4.1, i.e. that these bounds are matched by the private gossip protocol.
T . For all ϵ ≥ 0, Algorithm 1 with s = 0 guarantees (ϵ, δ )-di erential privacy and c-prediction uncertainty, with δ = f n and c = 0 in the synchronous setting, and δ = f n 1 − e ϵ −1 f and c = n f +1 − 1 in the asynchronous setting.
P
. For this protocol, the only outputs that have a di erent probability if node 0 starts (compared to the case when 1 starts) are those in which 0 (or 1) communicates with a curious node at time 0. This is true in both the synchronous and the asynchronous settings. Following our previous notations, we write these two events S 0 = 0 and S 0 = 1 and further denote by S (0) (resp. S (1) ) the set of output sequences such that S 0 = 0 (resp. S 0 = 1).
For the synchronous setting, we have p 0 (S 0 = 0) = p 1 (S 0 = 1) = f n and p 0 (S 0 = 1) = p 1 (S 0 = 0) = 0. This ensures that p 0 (S (0) ) ≤ p 1 (S (0) ) + f n (similarly for S (1) ), and the result follows. We now turn to the asynchronous setting. We denote by T 0 the event such that node 0 communicates with a curious node (and T c 0 the negation of this event). We have:
For any i C where C is the set of curious nodes, we have that p 0 (S 0 = 0|T c 0 ) = p 0 (S 0 = i |T c 0 ) = 1 n−f . Indeed, given T c 0 , the node that received the rst message was selected uniformly at random among noncurious nodes, and have the same probability to disclose the gossip at future rounds. Plugging into (6), we obtain:
For any other node i 0, p 0 (S 0 = i) = p 0 (T c 0 )p 0 (S 0 = i |T c 0 ) = 1 n because p 0 (S 0 = i |T 0 ) = 0. Combining these results we get p 0 (S (0) ) ≤ e ϵ p 1 (S (0) ) + δ for any ϵ > 0 and δ = f n (1 − e ϵ −1 f ). By symmetry, we can make a similar derivation for S (1) , which concludes the proof.
To prove the prediction uncertainty result, we use the di erential privacy result with e ϵ = f + 1 (and thus δ = 0 and write that for any S ∈ S:
C LIMITS ON THE DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY OF PROTOCOL ??
In this section, we prove a general result in the form of lower bounds on parameters ϵ and δ of di erential privacy that can be achieved by Algorithm 1, which then imply Theorem 5.1 as a corollary.
C.1 Synchronous se ing
For simplicity, we rst focus on the synchronous setting.
T C.1. If Algorithm 1 satis es (ϵ, δ )-di erential privacy in the synchronous setting, then the parameters (ϵ, δ ) need to satisfy the following relationships: The rst bound in Theorem C.1 is tighter for small values of s whereas the second one is more precise as s becomes closer to 1. This is because the rst bound ignores the communications occurring after round 1, whose impact is negligible only when s is small enough. A closer look at Equation (8) for a xed ratio f n of curious nodes indicates that the term involving ϵ reduces with n. This means that the e ect of ϵ becomes negligible as the network grows larger, allowing us to obtain Theorem 5.1. We give an illustration of Theorem C.1 in Figure 3 , which shows that the lower bound given by disclosure at the rst round is rather precise for many values of s. Yet, the second term clearly shows the explosion of the δ parameter when s is close to 1. P T 5.1 ( ). This is a direct corollary of Theorem C.1. Indeed, for any ∆ > 0 then we can set r such that (1 − f n ) r < ∆ 2 and then n large enough so that e ϵ f n 2 r +1 n < ∆ 2 so that we obtain δ ≥ 1 − ∆.
This implies p 0 (S (0) r |n c (r ) ≤ k * ) ≤ p 0 (0 ∈ I r |n c (r ) ≤ k * ) ≤ 1 − p(0 I r |n c (r ) ≤ k * ). We know that only r communications have reached curious nodes but the others have reached a random node in the graph, and there is at most k * of them, so nally:
We immediately see that p 1 (S (0) r ) goes to 0 as n grows because k * is independent of n, and we have shown above that p 0 (S (0) r ) goes to 1 as n grows. Since we must have that p 0 (S (0) r ) ≤ e ϵ p 1 (S (0) r ) + δ , we must have δ = 1 if we want δ to be independent of n.
D DELAYED START GOSSIP
Consider the protocol described in Remark 4.1, that we call delayed start gossip:
1. The source calls tell_gossip once to transmit the rumor to an arbitrary node, say node j. 2. Node j then starts a standard gossip (Algorithm 1 with s = 1). This simple protocol is optimal from the point of view of di erential privacy because if the rst communication does not hit a curious node then the probability of a given output when two di erent nodes start the gossip is the same. It is also fast since it runs the standard gossip after the rst round.
Yet, this naive protocol has a major aw. Indeed, when the rst communication hits a curious node, the attackers can monitor whether the sender communicates with them again in the next rounds. If it does not, they can guess that the node is the source, and they will in fact make a correct guess with probability arbitrarily close to 1 for large enough graphs. On the other hand, when the sender communicates again with a curious node shortly after, they can be very con dent that this node is not the source. Hence, it is possible to design a very simple attack with a very high precision (almost always right) and almost optimal recall ( nds the source when the information is released, i.e. with probability f n ). Making sure that the attacker is uncertain about its prediction is therefore a desirable property. This is captured by the notion of prediction uncertainty that we introduced in Section 3.3. The following proposition formalizes the above claims and motivates the need for more involved protocols such as the faster private gossip protocol presented in Section 5. Therefore, we have:
Note that we can also write for k ≥ 1:
Note that in particular, the proof holds for both the synchronous and asynchronous versions of Algorithm 1.
E.2 Prediction uncertainty
We prove here that the asynchronous version of our parameterized protocol (Algorithm 1) guarantees prediction uncertainty when s < 1 (Theorem 5.3). P T 5.3. For any set of sequences S ⊂ S such that p 0 (S) > 0, we have:
where A 1 is the set of active nodes at round 1. Because the state of the system (active nodes) is the same in both cases we can write that p i (S |A 1 = {0}) = p 0 (S). Besides, p i (A 1 = {0}) corresponds to the probability that node i sends a message to node 0 and then stops emitting. Therefore:
This shows that the fast private gossip guarantees prediction uncertainty and concludes the proof.
As stated in Section 3.3, prediction uncertainty guarantees are not robust to background knowledge. However, the de nition can be adapted to include such knowledge, for example to model the fact that attackers may know that some nodes did not start the rumor. This corresponds to changing the p(I 0 {0}|S) to p(I 0 ∈ |S), where is the set of nodes that can actually be suspected.
where f (η) = e η (1+η) (1+η) .
P
. To prove this theorem, we will use the set S r that contains all outputs such that neither 0 nor 1 communicate with curious nodes before round r . We callŜ r = S\S τ . We can write for any set of sequences S ∈ S:
with δ r = p 0 (Ŝ r ) + p 0 (1 I r ). Here, we can use the fact that neither 0 nor 1 communicates with a curious node before round r so p 0 (S ∩ S r | 1 ∈ I r ) = p 1 (S ∩ S r | 0 ∈ I r ), and because the graph is complete we have p 0 (1 ∈ I r ) = p 1 (0 ∈ I r ). Therefore,
Since p 0 (Ŝ r ) = p 1 (Ŝ r ) and p 0 (1 I r ) = p 1 (0 I r ) we conclude that the same result holds if we invert the roles of 0 and 1. The probability p 0 (Ŝ r ) that 0 or 1 transmit the information before r rounds is computed in Lemma F.2.
For the second part, we have to bound p(1 I r ). The idea of the proof is to split the analysis into 3 steps. At the beginning (until round R 1 ) there are very few informed nodes so their number doubles with high probability. Then, (until round R 2 ), the number of informed nodes does not exactly double at each round but still increases very fast (we use a Cherno bound to evaluate the probability). Finally, between rounds R 2 and r , we consider that the number of informed nodes does not increase anymore but at each step, there is a high probability that node 1 gets the value.
More formally, we write:
We can then conclude by using the Lemmas F.3, F.4 and F.5 to bound each quantity.
The complexity of this result is due to the extensive use of Cherno bounds. It is also necessary to de ne an appropriate sequence (η k ) associated with each bound. Optimal parameters r , R 1 and R 2 can be found by an extensive grid search. Approximations using the fact that n is big and f n is small give good indications on where to look for optimal values.
Note that when s is very close to 1, the δ given by Theorem F.1 is better than the one given by Theorem 5.2. This is due to the fact that the bound in Theorem 5.2 is not uniform in s. Theorem F.1 could be adapted to give slightly better results for s close to 1 in the case of non arbitrarily large graphs. However, we have already discussed the fact that taking s very close to 1 dramatically decreases privacy with no real boost in terms of speed (see Figure 4 ). Figure 4 shows the value of the bounds for n = 2 16 and di erent fractions of curious nodes. We see that the upper bound we get is relatively tight (same order of magnitude as the lower bound). However, taking a value s = 0.5 yields better privacy than the lower bound of the protocol for s = 1.
where the last line comes from the fact that p(1 ∈ I k | t 0 ≥ r ) ≤ |I k | n−f because we assumed that 0 did not communicate with a curious node so non curious nodes have higher chances of having been informed. L F.3. We have: p(|I t | = 2 t ) = (n − 1)! (n − 2 t )!n 2 t −1 .
. We denote by m k the event such that message k is not "lost" (i.e., hit a node that was not yet informed) and m 0,k the event such that no message until k has been lost.
We have:
where the third line comes from the fact that the probability of losing a message is simply the number of informed nodes over the total number of nodes. L F.4. We have:
L F.5. For R 1 ≤ R 2 and a sequence η k > 0, we have:
P . The bound is obtained by recursively applying a Cherno bound to control the number of messages that are lost at each step. We can write:
To obtain these inequalities, we used Bayes rule and the fact that for all M, r , p(|I r +1 | ≥ M r +1 | |I r | ≥ M r ) ≥ p(|I r +1 | ≥ M r +1 | |I r | = M r ). This comes from the fact that at step r , exactly |I r | messages are sent. Consider two set of nodes of cardinal A < B. Then, if M r +1 ≤ B the inequality is directly true since p(|I r +1 | ≥ M r +1 | |I r | = B) = 1. Now consider that M r +1 > B. Consider I r,k the set of informed nodes at round r after k messages are sent during this round (0 ≤ k ≤ |I r |). Then to have |I r +1 | ≥ M r +1 , there must exist some k * ≤ A such that |I r,k * | = B. In the second setting, this k * = 0 so B messages are yet to be sent whereas only A − k * can still be sent if |I r | = A. Since the probability of wasting a message only depends on the number of informed nodes at the time it was sent, and more messages will be sent in the second setting than in the rst one with same initial conditions, p(|I r +1 | ≥ M r +1 | |I r | = B) ≥ p(|I r +1 | ≥ M r +1 | |I r | = A).
We will now compute p(|I k+1 | ≥ M k +1 | |I k | = M k ). For that, we write W r the number of messages that are wasted at step r . Then, we have for all M r +1 , M r by using the fact that each informed node sends a message: p(|I r +1 | ≤ M r +1 | |I r | = M r ) = p(|I r | + |I r | − W r ≤ M r +1 | |I r | = M r ) = p(W r ≥ 2M r − M r +1 | |I r | = M r ).
Unfortunately, the event such that the message is lost depends on how many messages have been lost in the past. We note V r,k the random variable such that V r,k = 1 with probability p = 2 M r −1 n and 0 otherwise, and V r = M r k=1 V r,k . Then, for all M ∈ R, we have p(W r ≥ M) ≤ p(V r ≥ M) because p is an upper bound on the probability of wasting a message no matter how many messages have been lost before. We x η r > 0 and M r +1 = 2M r − (1 + η r )p) = 2M r 1 − (1 + η) M r −1 n−1 . Applying a Cherno bound to V r leads to:
where f (η) = e η (1+η) 1+η results from the use of the Cherno bound.
G DISSEMINATION SPEED OF FAST PRIVATE GOSSIP
In this section, we prove Theorem 5.4 and discuss extensions of this result to the asynchronous setting.
G.1 Proof of Theorem 5.4 P T 5.4. This proof builds on ideas from Lemma 15 in [39] and uses Azuma inequality [35] , for example to obtain Equation 16 . We start by showing that if more than k(s) nodes are informed at a given time, then with very high probability the number of informed nodes will never drop below this fraction. Therefore, a number of messages proportional to the size of the graph will be sent at each round. The condition on s for this to happen is written in Equation 18 . More formally, we x s ∈ (0, 1] and denote by A t the number of nodes that are active at round t, which is such that A t = α t n. Then, we note
where p u (α) = (1 − 1 n ) α n . Note that f (α) can be rewritten f (α) = 1 n E[A t +1 − A t |A t = αn]. As a matter of fact, for each node, the probability of getting the message is exactly 1 − p u (α) so n (1 − p u (α)) nodes get the message in expectation. The rest of the active nodes at the following round is made of the nodes that were active, did not receive the message and did not deactivate, which represents a portion nαp u (α)s of the nodes. Then, one can see that the function f is simply the sum of these 2 terms. We show by using that (1 − x) ≤ e −x ≤ 1 − x + 
Then, we follow the same steps as in Lemma 15 in [39] . We call A t the number of active nodes at round t, and A t,m the number of active nodes at round t after m messages have been sent (so during the round). Then, we can de ne X i = A t,i+1 − A t,i . A t,i+1 only depends on A t,i and so does X i :
Then, we de ne the martingale
This allows us to write A t +1 − n f (α) = Z A t − Z 0 . If we call S k,t = A t i=k X i then for any d ∈ {−1, 0, 1}: E[S 1,t |X 1 , , X i , X i+1 = 1, A t ] ≥ E[S 1,t |X 1 , · · · , X i , X i+1 = d, A t ] ≥ E[S 1,t |X 1 , · · · , X i , X i+1 = −1, A t ], because the distribution of X i only depends on A t,i . Therefore, |Z i+1 − Z i | ≤ (1 + E[S i+1,t |A t + 1]) − (E[S i+1,t |A t − 1] − 1)] ≤ 2. Azuma's inequality then gives:
p(A 0,m −a ≤ −λ) ≤ e − λ 2 8m for any a ≤ E[S n ]. Then, we denote E i the event such that X i ≥ 0 for all i and write that E[S n ] ≥ p(E i )E[S n |E i ]. Considering that A 0,m ≤ m, we can write that E[S n ] ≥ (1 − (1 −s) m n ) m ms(1 − m n ). Therefore, we can apply Azuma inequality with λ = ms 1 2 − m n [(1 − s)m − 1] , which yields:
The number of messages sent during rounds 1 to t 0 is at least equal to m ≥ t 0 . We set t 0 = 512 s 3 log(3n), and since for n large enough we have m n [(1 − s)m − 1] ≤ 1 4 , then
We conclude the proof by noting that p N 0,t 0 +t α +Cα −1 log n ≥ Cn log n ≥ p A t 0 ≥ 256 s 2 log n p A t α +t 0 ≥ nα |A t 0 ≥ 256 s 2 log n p N t α +t 0 ,t α +t 0 +Cα −1 log n ≥ Cn log n|A n α ≥ α ≥ 1 − 1 3n
The number of rounds is logarithmic since both t 0 and t α depend logarithmically on n.
G.2 Extension to the asynchronous se ing
The rst part of the proof directly extends to the asynchronous algorithm by simply considering slices of time during which a set of αn nodes send αn messages, which essentially means constant time. Then, we consider a logarithmic number of slices. The phase from 1 to O(log n) active nodes requires sending a logarithmic number of messages and can thus be done in logarithmic time. Finally, phase 2 (going from O(log n) to O(n) active nodes) consists in evaluating a logarithmic number of rounds during which a logarithmic number of nodes are active. Again, the only important thing is the number of messages sent (and not which node sent them) so using constant time intervals ensures that enough messages are sent between each pseudo-rounds with high probability. Therefore, it is possible to prove a statement very similar to that of Theorem 5.4 in the asynchronous setting, where the notion of rounds is replaced by constant time intervals. We omit the exact details of this alternative formulation.
